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Peter Brookst
Stanley Fish is a brilliant contributor to our debates about interpreta-
tion. He is also relentless. Doing What Comes Naturally must reprint
every word he has written over the past decade: some twenty-two essays,
amounting to a book of 613 pages. The volume is endlessly repetitious,
since Fish stakes out the same territory in each of the domains he enters,
and makes the same moves in besieging the various citadels he wants to
capture. One might wish for an essence of Fish: a short book that would
set forth the argument in its general form, then demonstrate the kind of
application it has to the different fields under consideration. One must
instead make do with this series of interventions in debates whose original
terms are set by Fish's interlocutors, but which always return to the same
point.
That point, over and over, is essentially this: that there is no foundation
for interpretation that does not derive from the activity of interpretation
itself. Since there are no independent grounds for interpretation, there is
no escape from rhetoric, meaning the discourse of persuasion, the norms
and constraints of which in every case are defined by one's membership in
a given professional community of interpretation. The title Doing What
Comes Naturally refers to what Fish in his Preface calls
the unreflective actions that follow from being embedded in a context
of practice. This kind of action-and in my argument there is no
other-is anything but natural in the sense of proceeding indepen-
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dently of historical and social formations; but once those formations
are in place (and they always are), what you think to do will not be
calculated in relation to a higher law or an overarching theory but
will issue from you as naturally as breathing.'
Fish has of course for some time been working on the notion of "commu-
nities of interpretation," a dominant concept in his earlier Is There a Text
in this Class? (1980). The concept logically derived from, and in some
ways brilliantly resolved the uncertainties of, "reader-response criticism,"
which always faced the problem of constraint and consensus in interpreta-
tion. If meaning is no longer in the text but in the reader's response to the
text, what is to discipline the most errant subjectivity, and to prevent in-
terpretation from becoming a solipsistic enterprise? The interpretive com-
munity provides an answer, since members of that community discipline
one another through shared norms of what is pertinent and what is not.
Those who were attracted to the notion of interpretive communities but
were troubled by certain issues it raised-for instance, adjudication of the
claims of competing communities, and the production of change within a
consensual community-will find only the coldest of comforts in Doing
What Comes Naturally. For here the concept of community has become so
closed as to be claustrophobic-there is literally no way out from the com-
munity you happen to have got yourself embedded in-and "Change," so
far as I can tell from the rather unsatisfactory essay with that title, has
become the product of a mysterious negotiation among members of the
community, who all the while continue to do what comes naturally. In the
movement from Is There a Text in this Class? to Doing What Comes
Naturally, two of the more disquieting elements of the earlier book have
come to dominate in Fish's thinking: the apologia for professionalism, and
the simple valorization of power as what, in the last analysis, determines
meanings and the adjudication among competing interpretive claims.
Let me start with a relatively anodyne example that can help to charac-
terize where Fish now stands: the essay "No Bias, No Merit," which
concerns a shift in policy of Publications of the Modern Language Associ-
ation, which decided to institute the practice of "blind submission,"
whereby the name of the author submitting an essay for publication is
effaced before it enters the process of peer review. Fish's point is that an
essay submitted by someone like Stanley Fish is different in status by the
fact of its authorship than one submitted by Professor Unknown because
the name "Stanley Fish" stands for a prior body of written material
which gives him a certain professional identity and even authority. Since
Paradise Lost, as we now know and read it, is in some measure a product
of Stanley Fish's interpretive work on it, anything new that Stanley Fish
1. S. FISH, DOING WHAT ComEs NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF
THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES ix (1989) [hereinafter by page numbers].
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says about Paradise Lost is necessarily of interest. To pretend that the
same essay signed Stanley Fish and Professor Unknown is in no way dif-
ferent because of the signature is to take an ostrich's position in the polit-
ics of interpretation, which have to do not only with what arguments are
advanced, but who is advancing them, from what position and on what
grounds. The argument for "intrinsic merit" simply begs the questions of
the grounds-professionally determined-that identify both of those
terms. As Fish puts it, "merit, rather than being a quality that can be
identified independently of professional or institutional conditions, is a
product of those conditions." 2 This essay was written in 1979 (and never
published); in a 1988 addition, Fish notes that the opposition to this posi-
tion has shifted over the years, since a new generation in the academy
began to argue that all merit depends on politics, on socio-economic power
realities outside the profession, and must be analyzed as such. "In 1979
. . " writes Fish, "I was arguing for politics and against transcendence;
now I am arguing for politics and against Politics (the new
transcendence)." 3
The argument of "No Bias, No Merit," reveals Fish at his best, in a
remarkably lucid presentation of why one cannot perform valid acts of
criticism by breaking free of a profession's norms and constraints, since
the very conditions of intelligibility and authority are underwritten by
professional norms and constraints. The argument is taken a step further
in "Anti-Professionalism," where he expertly recuperates radical critiques
of the professional ethos as part of the essential internal dynamics of
professionalism:
As we have seen again and again, anti-professionalism is by and
large a protest against those aspects of professionalism that constitute
a threat to individual freedom, true merit, genuine authority. It is
therefore the strongest representation within the professional com-
munity of the ideals which give that community its (ideological)
form. Far from being a stance taken at the margins or the periphery
. . . anti-professionalism is the very center of the professional ethos,
constituting by the very vigor of its opposition the true form of that
which it opposes. Professionalism cannot do without anti-
professionalism: it is the chief support and maintenance of the pro-
fessional ideology; its presence is a continual assertion and sign of
the purity of the profession's intentions.4
Thus Fish is able to take such contestations as Richard Ohmann's Eng-
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themselves as challenging the very assumptions and bases of professional
business-as-usual, and show them to be a necessary part of the internal
dialectics that set and revise the standards of the profession.
Fish's argument is unimpeachable so far as it goes, but it is also, I
think, smug and trivializing. What is wrong with it is perhaps most of all
its tone of self-satisfaction in demonstrating that even the most radical
questionings of professionalism can be subsumed within professionalism.
For the critique of professionalism generally takes the form of a warning
that exclusive dedication to professional concerns-more and more writing
on ever smaller subjects, hyperspecialization, a proliferation of discipli-
nary busy work, the promotion of careerism-can blind one to the large
questions of why one needed the profession in the first place. The study of
literature, for instance, needs to remind itself periodically-in fact, inces-
santly-that literature is a human activity, a reformulation of the world
that serves human needs. The profession does not of itself provide a con-
text that fosters and distinguishes work that is of more than routine inter-
est; much truly significant work is in fact transgressive of professional
norms, and cannot be absorbed until these change. Fish would of course
claim that such transgressions are recuperable to the professional con-
straints that make them possible in the first place. But that claim can be
urged only on a weak and trivial conception of transgression, which in
Fish's logic is always already recuperated: "[C]onstraints are not some-
thing one can either embrace or throw off because they are constitutive of
the self and of its possible actions."'
We may begin to suspect that the ways in which Fish is right depend
on a weakened sense of that which stands in opposition to his position,
and ultimately, as I shall suggest, a somewhat trivialized notion of what
constitutes that "self." Consider his arguments concerning the status of
"theory," which has of course been a deity much worshipped of late in
many fields. Fish's main point is that "theory has no consequences." 7 It
has no consequences because theory will never provide an "outside" of
practice that would allow one to ground practice, to establish, indepen-
dently of the practice, its principles and rules. Doing theory is in fact a
form of practice, what Fish chooses to call "theory-talk": a kind of dis-
course that clearly has a value in debate, and is indeed currently a kind of
requirement of debate, but has no transcendent position in relation to the
professional context which has set the terms of the debate. Now, for Fish
to be right about the inconsequentiality of theory depends, as he acknowl-
edges, on a restricted definition of theory:
I reserve that word for an abstract or algorithmic formulation that
6. P. 27.
7. P. 14.
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guides or governs practice from a position outside any particular
conception of practice. A theory, in short, is something a practitioner
consults when he wishes to perform correctly, with the term "cor-
rectly" here understood as meaning independently of his preconcep-
tions, biases, or personal preferences. To be sure, the word "theory"
is often used in other, looser ways, to designate high-order general-
izations, or strong declarations of basic beliefs, or programmatic
statements of political or economic agendas, or descriptions of under-
lying assumptions. . . . When I assert the lack of a relationship be-
tween theory and practice I refer to the kind of relationship (of pre-
cedence and priority) implied by the strongest notion of theory; the
relationships that do exist between theory and practice (and there
are many) are no different from the relationships between any form
of talk and the practice of which it is a component.8
In other words, the assertion of the inconsequentiality of theory derives
from a definition of theory that gives it the status of theory in the sciences,
which in turn makes everything that goes by the name of theory in the
interpretive disciplines something else. This strikes me as both true and
trivial, and as not very helpful.
Our usual sense of "theory"-in literature and in law, for instance-is
a higher-order generalization which derives from a reflection on the gen-
eral principles guiding practice, and then in turn feeds back into practice.
Theory is an explicitation of practice, and a model of understanding. As
such it is useful, even necessary, since, as Roland Barthes pointed out long
ago, even when you don't think you have a theory (when you think you
are simply doing what comes naturally), you do have an unacknowledged
one: theory as an ideology.9 Barthes went on, in his Inaugural Lecture at
the Collge de France, to renounce any attempt to find a "metalanguage,"
thus liquidating the "high structuralist" search, during the 1960's and
1970's, for universals of linguistic and literary analysis and recognizing
his passage to "post-structuralism." But the recognition that there is no
foundational theory in the human sciences-the renunciation of the dream
of a place outside from which to gain leverage on language-did not entail
for Barthes, and need not entail for anyone, the claim that theory is with-
out consequences. It rather imposes a more tentative, dialectical, even
playful role on theory as a reconfiguration of practice.
Here, as so often elsewhere, Fish is so anxious to make a flamboyant
claim, to stake out a striking position, that he is forced to reduce the con-
cepts at issue to rigid and narrow versions of themselves, with the result
that while his formulations are undoubtedly true so far as they go, they
don't go very far: the big bang ends in something of a whimper. Fish of
course has seen round this corner far enough to grant the point. Consider,
8. P. 378.
9. R. BARTHES, CRITIQUE ELT VERITE (1966).
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for instance, his crucial argument concerning the relation of principle to
force, of rules and laws to personal preferences. "Does might make
right?" he asks, to reply: "In a sense the answer I must give is yes, since
in the absence of a perspective independent of interpretation some inter-
pretive perspective will always rule by virtue of its having won out over
its competitors."' In the ensuing argument, principles and preferences
are shown to be the same thing, with the former merely preferences that
have gained, for the moment, the force of authority. "It is in this sense,"
Fish continues,
that force is the sole determinant of outcomes, but the sting is re-
moved from this conclusion when force is understood not as "pure"
or "mere" force (phenomena never encountered) but as the urging
(perhaps in the softest terms) of some point of view, of some vision of
the world complete with purposes, goals, standards, reasons-in
short, with everything to which force is usually opposed in the name
of principle."1
If he here offers an effective demonstration of why foundationalist think-
ing can always be undermined by the anti-foundationalist critique, his
conclusion is so unexceptional that one need no longer fear that Fish is a
sting-ray. Force has become simply the force of reasoned persuasion.
To be sure, to put everything on the basis of persuasion-that is, of
rhetoric-does have far-reaching implications, if not so much for theory
itself as it has been understood in the human sciences, certainly for the
practice of law. Law would seem to be a profession and form of thought
that needs to lay claim to a theory of justice and its derivable principles if
it is not to be simply the exercise of force: the rule of "the gun at the
head." In a series of essays, most of them already celebrated or notorious,
Fish takes on such legal thinkers as Ronald Dworkin, Owen Fiss, Rich-
ard Posner, and H.L.A. Hart. Among the vexed issues that he addresses is
the problem of intentions, which he nicely stands on its head. To Dwor-
kin's argument-familiar to generations of literary scholars-that inter-
pretation can proceed as the construing of sense and need not and should
not depend on the identification of authorial intention, Fish replies that it
is impossible to interpret without postulating intention. Assumptions
about the intention of statements are simply part of the act of interpreta-
tion, since we assume that statements are made with purposes, with
claims on meaning and conviction. Fish freely concedes that such an ac-
count of intention renders it "methodologically useless. One cannot use it
(as some intentionalist critics want to) as a constraint on or key to inter-
pretation because it is not distinguishable from that which it would con-
10. P. 10.
11. P. 12.
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strain."" Now, Fish's account of the status of intentions in interpretation
seems to me correct, and indeed the only account viable in textual inter-
pretation. But it doesn't really address the kind of intentionalist argument
in legal studies that concerns Dworkin. When Posner, for instance (or
Robert Bork), argues a constitutional interpretation from intention, that
intention is not textually derived or derivable. It is considered to be
pretextual (though it may be derived from other texts, such as the Feder-
alist Papers or the ratification debates) and thus to offer, an independent
entity that can be compared to meanings construable from the written
text. One can think such an intentionalism misguided, as I do, but you
will not be able to argue with its proponents on the basis of Fish's view.
You are better off with Dworkin's attempt to insulate interpretation from
intentionalism.
Fish's argument with legal theory finds its most acute and definitive
form in the essay on H.L.A. Hart's The Concept of Law." Here, it is
relatively easy for Fish to show that Hart's distinction between a "core of
settled meaning" and a "penumbra" of uncertainty and doubt is in fact a
product of the interpretive activity which it claims to guide by the fixing
of rules and limits (that which is not open to doubt in interpretation).
"While the distinction between core and penumbra can always be made at
a particular moment, at another moment the interpretive conditions
within which the distinction is perspicuous can be challenged and dis-
lodged."' 4 Fish compares the search for this "settled core" of meaning to
the idea that language can have a literal meaning separable from its
rhetoricity, and to the argument-urged in various guises by Stephen
Toulmin and Wayne Booth as well as Hart and other jurisprudential
thinkers-that one can be skeptical about one's own beliefs, discount one's
own prejudices. Fish's response is to claim that we can never divest our-
selves of ideological convictions, that "reason and belief" are in fact identi-
cal, that "you can never get away from your beliefs, which means that you
can never get away from force, from the pressure exerted by a practical,
non-neutral, nonauthoritative, ungrounded point of view."'" Once again,
the very conditions of reason turn out to be consubstantial with premises
that are assumptions, beliefs. This leads Fish to some flashy formulations:
"[T]he force of the law is always and already indistinguishable from the
forces it would oppose. Or to put the matter another way: There is always
a gun at your head."'6 That gun can be an internalized conception as
much as an external coercion, which leads to Fish's next aphorism: [T]he
12. P. 117.
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gun at your head is your head."" Force, in this sense, becomes interest
aggressively pursued""8 : one's marshalling of arguments in favor of a
"complex of goals and purposes, underwritten by a vision, and put into
operation by a detailed agenda."19
What is wrong with the argument is not its logic-which seems to me
unassailable on its own terms-but its ultimately trivial view of mind, or
psyche, and its relation to the notion of law. If you want to equate reason
and belief, then you need to pursue a more probing argument about the
nature of beliefs, including the belief in justice and rules. Such an analysis
might lead you to the conclusion that a belief in justice is merely the crea-
tion of Nietzschean ressentiment, or perhaps a byproduct of the Oedipal
conflict, the emergence of the "Name of the Father" from the interdiction
of incest as the fundamental rule. But wherever you seek the source of the
notion of law, you must recognize it as a fundamental category of thought
of all known human societies. Thus to identify it simply as a product of
ideology, as that gun at one's head that is one's head, is to fail to analyze
the head and how what's there got there. Fish is strangely uninterested in
the problem he keeps throwing up: the problem of belief, of ideology, ulti-
mately cognitive and ethical problems of mind. One has the impression
that mind, in so far as he takes notice of it, is merely the repository of
professional determinations.
Fish fails, here and elsewhere, to recognize that interpretation involves
not only epistemological problems but also ethical ones. Choices have to be
made about beliefs and actions, and also about interpretation, and these
choices are often essentially moral in nature. As Dworkin urges, moral
propositions can be debated only in moral arguments. Anti-
foundationalism or relativism may themselves be ethically necessary posi-
tions, but they do not excuse one from making further choices within a
given practice. Fish's view of choice as simply "preference," determined
by one's professional context, severs him from any concern with the ethics
of interpretation.
This problem becomes acutely visible in the final essay of Doing What
Comes Naturally, where Fish, having slain all the other monsters in his
path, goes to his encounter with the Sphinx-or perhaps with Laius the
father-in the person of Freud. In his commentary on that much-
commented-upon text, Freud's case-history of the Wolf-Man,20 Fish
claims that Freud is engaged in a rhetorical power-play, beating his pa-




20. S. FREUD, From the History of an Infantile Neurosis (1918), in 17 THE STANDARD EDITION
OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 3 (J. Strachey ed. 1974) [hereinaf-
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of the Wolf-Man's "primal scene"-witnessing his parents' copula-
tion-is really about the "discursive power of which and by which it has
been constructed."'" That is, the unfolding of the Wolf-Man's story really
mimics Freud's own persuasive rhetoric. Freud finds what he needs, and
orders it in a dramatic presentation of unfolding, in a narrative that has
no other basis than its need to persuade. Fish renews here-without any
apparent awareness of his predecessors-a traditional attack on psychoa-
nalysis: that it is really "suggestion," that everything the psychoanalyst
finds is what he has put into his patient's head. Fish also displays a lack
of awareness of Freud's own acute awareness of this problem, best ex-
pressed in some of the late essays, such as "Constructions in Analysis,"
which begins with Freud's recognition that psychoanalysis is often held to
be the art of "Heads I win, tails you lose."22 Psychoanalysis can be so
characterized because of its peculiar treatment of "yes" and "no" in its
subjects, where the latter may be the equivalent of the former, the sign of
repression and resistance. Freud in "Constructions in Analysis" under-
takes a discussion of the status of "yes" and "no" in psychoanalytic work,
a discussion that of course turns on unconscious mental processes and
their representation in discourse.
Fish derives from the Wolf-Man case-history many of the principles of
analytic narrative construction that Freud examines in "Constructions in
Analysis," while claiming Freud's blindness to them. Essentially, psychoa-
nalysis may work by constructing narratives of the past that have no de-
monstrable basis in reality other than this ability to convince the patients
that they must be true. In other words, the proof-test of psychoanalytic
narratives does not necessarily reside in their capacity to revive clear
memories of the past, but rather in the force of the conviction they carry:
the way in which they appear to the patient to make sense of his or her
life, to bring the past story of unconscious desire to bear on the present
discourse. In this sense, Fish is quite correct to say that "the assumption
of the primal scene proves itself by its effects, by its ability to bring order
to an apparently heterogeneous mass of fragments and impressions.
2z3
Freud's notions of causality and connection in the psychoanalytic narra-
tive became more and more complicated as he pursued his work: Simple
chronology was put into question by the workings of deferred action or
retroaction; the part played by event and by phantasy became more diffi-
cult, even impossible, to unravel; the dynamic interaction of the transfer-
ence meant that the analyst was working in an uncertain realm of present
revivals of past affects. The only "proof" of the successful narrative came
to lie in its effects, in its ability to order, explain, and eventually, to cure.
21. P. 547.
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Fish can write off the Wolf-Man as a rhetorical power play because he
believes neither in the unconscious nor in cure. For Fish, "the unconscious
is not a concept but a rhetorical device, a placeholder which can be given
whatever shape the polemical moment requires,"2 by which I suppose
that he means that one can never prove the existence of the unconscious;
indeed, one can only know it through its effects, which is what it is
designed to explain. To say this is to repeat the standard anti-
foundationalist gesture: to claim that one can never prove the basis that
one uses for one's proofs. True enough, but once one has made that clever
pirouette, shouldn't the real work begin-in this instance, an argument
about what belief in the unconscious might mean, what it may explain,
what superior picture it may give (if it does give) of what we know about
the operations of human mind and behavior? Not much seems to be at
stake in psychoanalysis for Fish: in his argument about Freud's "scene of
persuasion," the patient disappears, leaving only the reader. The idea that
persuasion might work on and for the patient because the constructed psy-
choanalytic narrative does make sense of the buried history of unconscious
desire, and thus does bring some clarity to an otherwise muddled life,
simply doesn't occur to him. Psychoanalysis has become purely a field for
literary critics.
Fish proposes as an epigraph to his essay:
a report by the Wolf-Man of what he thought to himself shortly
after he met Freud for the first time: "this man is a Jewish swindler,
he wants to use me from behind and shit on my head." This paper is
dedicated to the proposition that the Wolf-Man got it right.25
I confess to find this both sad and symptomatic as an epigraph to the final
essay of Doing What Comes Naturally. Fish's rhetorical analysis of the
case-history is characteristically brilliant, and ultimately trivial, in that it
refuses to debate the very questions that have made psychoanalysis a cen-
tral controversy of Western thought since its inception. At very least, Fish
might have recognized that psychoanalysis is one field that claims to have
a theory of the origin of the notion of law-indeed, of Law-as a kind of
absolute in psychic and social life. The Oedipus complex may not be
provable, and it is no doubt historically contingent, but that doesn't mean
that it lacks explanatory value. It certainly provides a working hypothesis
of how humans function that is superior to Fish's "thd gun at your head is
your head," for it roots the construction of that "gun" in lived processes of
everyone's maturation. Fish is simply too good and too valuable a critic
for us to be happy to see him circumscribe himself in such facile rhetorical
maneuvers. Yes, everything is rhetorical. Yes, correct interpretations are
24. P. 534.
25. P. 526.
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determined by power of, and power within, interpretive communities. But
granted all this, there are still choices to be made within the fallen world.
After finishing Doing What Comes Naturally, we may want to respond in
the manner of a psychoanalyst-not the one who listened to the Wolf-
Man, but rather the one who has just finished hearing Portnoy's com-
plaint: "Now vee may perhaps to begin. Yes?"

The Female Body and the Law: On
Truth and Lies
The Female Body and the Law. By Zillah R. Eisenstein.* Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1988. Pp. ix, 235. $25.00.
Ruth Colkert
As a professor, I look for books or articles to assign to my students that
are both informative and well-written. Unfortunately, some of the work
that I think captures the essence of critical theory is quite difficult to com-
prehend.1 It is therefore refreshing to find work which represents a criti-
cal perspective and works well in the classroom. Zillah Eisenstein's most
recent book, The Female Body and the Law,2 is such a work, and I would
recommend it highly to feminists and critical scholars for use in the
classroom.
Unlike many of the writers in feminist jurisprudence, Eisenstein comes
to her enterprise with a background in political science. She has been a
prolific writer in the area of feminist theory, having written books such as
The Radical Future of Liberal Feminisms and Feminism and Sexual
Equality: Crisis in Liberal America,4 as well as having edited Capitalist
Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism.' As her writing and
thinking have matured, she has made substantial contributions to our un-
derstanding of a wide variety of feminist perspectives, ranging from liberal
* Professor of Politics, Ithaca College.
t Professor of Law, Tulane University; Visiting Professor of Law, University of Toronto (spring
1990). I would like to thank John Stick and Joan Williams for their helpful comments on a draft of
this essay. Joan and I have agreed to disagree about some aspects of Eisenstein's book, and I suggest
that the reader read her review of Eisenstein's book which will appear in the Michigan Law Review's
annual survey of books relating to the law. Williams, Feminism & Post-Structuralism: Zillah Eisen-
stein, The Female Body and the Law, 88 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 1990).
1. The works of Roberto Unger, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jacques Lacan, and Julia
Kristeva come to mind. Some of the difficulty may be attributable to problems of translation, as I have
read much of this work in translation from French. See, e.g., J. KRISTEVA, THE KRISTEVA READER
(T. Moi ed. 1986);J. KRISTEVA, ABoUr CHINESE WOMEN (1986); R. UNGER, PASSION: AN ESSAY
ON PERSONALITY (1984).
2. Z. EISENSTrEIN, THE FEMALE BODY AND THE LAW (1988) [hereinafter cited by page number
only].
3. Z. EIsENSTEIN, THE RADICAL FUTURE OF LIBERAL FEMINISM (1981) (arguing that liberal
feminism is inherently radical and is not pure liberalism).
4. Z. EISENSTEIN, FEMINISM AND SEXUAL EQUALITY: CRISIS IN LIBERAL AMERICA (1984) (dis-
cussing weakness of liberal theory as applied to feminist issues of equality).
5. CAPITALIST PATRIARCHY AND THE CASE FOR SOCIALIST FEMINISM (Z. Eisenstein ed. 1979)
(anthology of writings on socialist feminism).
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feminism to socialist feminism. Rather than emphasizing the differences
among the different feminist perspectives and arguing that only one per-
spective represents the "true" feminist perspective, she has served an ac-
commodating role in the feminist movement by emphasizing the similarity
of various feminist perspectives and the lack of a need to choose among
competing theoretical perspectives.'
Eisenstein's latest book, The Female Body and the Law, is her finest
yet. She tries to offer insight into an alternative way to view the legal
significance of the female body, getting us out of the trap of adopting
either the "special treatment" or "equal treatment" perspective. In addi-
tion, drawing on her earlier work on liberal feminism,' she tries to show
how we, as feminists, do not have to discard liberal theory entirely in
order to maintain a radical feminist perspective. Finally, she offers some
clarity on the difficult issue of how to determine "truth." She says that we
should recognize that the world contains multiple and ever-changing
truths about any particular issue. Thus, she concludes, we should choose
our positions on issues with openness and honesty, recognizing that any
position must be open to revision as political-social circumstances change.
As I will discuss, Eisenstein's work has given me fresh insight on how
to think about the pregnancy cases-to consider how to describe with cer-
tainty and clarity that it is sex-based discrimination when an employer
fails to provide pregnancy-related disability or health care benefits. Never-
theless, there are two conclusions in her work which I find troubling.
First, Eisenstein seems to conclude that feminist theory cannot accom-
modate the possibility that there are any objective truths. I will argue that
that statement is implausible logically, but more importantly, it is a wrong
account of the possibilities underlying feminist theory. Feminist theory
necessarily presumes that there is an objective set of ethics within society
upon which feminists can rely in seeking to change the material conditions
of women's lives.
Second, Eisenstein seems to conclude that we can avoid difficult theoret-
ical choices in dealing with particular problems-that we do not, for ex-
ample, have to choose between special treatment or equal treatment per-
spectives in the pregnancy context or that we do not have to choose
between privacy and equality perspectives in the abortion context. Al-
though I think that Eisenstein has offered an important insight-that we
do not have to choose consistent theoretical positions across all issues and
across all historical moments-I think she has overstated her claim. As I
6. This approach puts her in sharp contrast to Catharine MacKinnon, who consistently argues
that radical feminism is the only "true" feminism. See C. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:
DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 137 (1987). It also places her in contrast to Alison Jaggar, who
purports to survey feminist theory but actually is trying to convince the reader of the merits of a
socialist-feminist perspective. See A. JAGGAR, FEMINIST PoLrrcs AND HUMAN NATURE (1983).
7. See Z. EmENSTEIN, supra note 3.
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will try to show through the use of particular examples, it is often impor-
tant to struggle with difficult theoretical choices on particular issues; our
failure to do so may make us less politically effective. I will suggest that
we cannot always reduce the tension between opposing feminist positions
by searching for middle grounds; instead, we can reduce the tension by
making difficult choices in particular historical circumstances but articu-
lating, as we make these choices, that the opposing perspectives represent
important values and that our choices must be constantly open to re-
examination. Eisenstein's observation that we should define truth with
openness should be receptive to such a claim.
In this essay, I will first discuss Eisenstein's claims about truth and
reality. Second, I will discuss Eisenstein's application of her general per-
spective on truth to how legal scholars and practitioners should think
about the female body. Finally, I will discuss how feminists should apply
their understanding of truth and reality to feminist argumentation.
I. ON TRUTH AND REALITY
Relying on a critical perspective, Eisenstein adopts a vision of reality
that "is neither subjective nor objective."' Reality is a series of discourses,
meanings are open rather than closed, and the truth may have multiple
and shifting meanings. Truth is part of a discourse about power and spe-
cific historical relations. There is no place outside discourse; even the term
"discourse" exists within a theory of knowledge and power that gives it its
meaning at a particular time. Rather than talk about "the truth" as a
static, pre-social entity, Eisenstein urges us to talk about multiple, shifting
truths that reflect our present historical circumstances.
One common criticism that is made of this perspective is that it leaves
us hopelessly relativistic, because we cannot make any assessment about
what is better or worse in society. Eisenstein rejects such a criticism:
It is only within a standpoint that privileges objectivity and absolutes
that relativism and pluralism present a problem. Plurality does not
mean that all truths are equal; it merely uncovers the role of power
in defining truth. Once truth has been defined, we are free to argue
in behalf of our interpretation, but we cannot use the claim to truth
itself as our defense. Although I assume that knowledge (and truth)
is plural, I do not allow this assumption to keep me from arguing
that society must be organized around a notion of sex equality that
recognizes the specificity of the pregnant body from a standpoint of
radical pluralism. The assumption of plurality does, though, keep
me from bringing closure to the meaning of the pregnant body in
8. P. 22.
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terms of the meaning of sameness or difference or equality. We must
leave meanings open at the same time that we act on them.9
Thus, truths are not "objective" because transhistorical, fixed, unitary,
statements are impossible.
Eisenstein then applies her perspective to how the law should consider
the female body or, more generally, how we should think about sex differ-
ences. The significance of the body, like all truth, cannot stand outside
society, history, and language. It, too, must be open to multiple and
changing meanings. Eisenstein argues that we must view "the body as a
capacity rather than a static entity ... "-o
In one of her central attempts to avoid dichotomous thinking, Eisenstein
mentions that we must not adopt the "unity" perspective or the "diver-
sity" perspective in thinking about the body. She says that "we must rec-
ognize both the unity-the concept of the 'body'-and the diver-
sity-actual bodies-as they exist.""1
Eisenstein's argument at this point is difficult to understand. She is not
saying that we should stop talking about sex differences. Instead, she is
trying to adopt a way to talk about sex differences that uses her "radical
pluralist methodology."' 2 Under this perspective, she tries not to overstate
homogeneity or heterogeneity. For example, she concludes: "We must
therefore seek the unities as well as the diversity in difference(s). We need
to examine and understand 'different similarities' and 'similar differ-
ences.' "s She argues for a method that "takes both specificity and unity
(meaning homogeneity) as its starting point."' 4
As I will discuss later, I do find her approach helpful in thinking about
the female body and pregnancy cases. Nevertheless, I think her claims
about truth have fundamental problems which are commonplace within
feminist theory and are therefore worthy of some attention.
Eisenstein says that there is no transhistorical, fixed, singular truth
which could be called "objective." Instead there are multiple truths which
we have created through discourse. 5 On the level of pure logic,' 6 it is easy
to see that Eisenstein's claim cannot be accurate. In making that state-






14. P. 36 (emphasis in original).
15. P. 22.
16. If this were only a logical problem, then I might not discuss it. However, I find that this kind
of statement impedes my ability to read feminist theory. If there are no truths, then I wonder why I
should read a book filled with the asserted truths of another feminist. Of course, I must persist and
read because I realize that we are all engaged in a search for truths, despite such disclaimers.
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The statement is circular; if her assertion is accurate then her statement is
wrong.
One way to preserve Eisenstein's observation is to modify it to mean
that there is no transhistorical, fixed truth other than the statement that
there is no truth.1 7 That, at least, is a more workable statement that de-
serves some response. 18
Even if I reformulate Eisenstein's perspective in that way, I do not find
it plausible. As I will discuss below, feminist theory needs to rely on the
possibility of multiple objective truths-one of which is not the belief that
there are no objective truths. Before turning to why I believe such objec-
tive truths are necessary, I will discuss the response to the apparent illogic
in her position that Eisenstein does provide.
Eisenstein attempts to counter critiques such as mine by relying on a
distinction offered by Linda Gordon: Although there is no objective truth,
there are objective lies. 19 Furthermore, Gordon suggests that while some
history is more accurate than other types of history, no history qualifies as
objectively true. 0
Gordon's work, however, does not get us out of the problem that I have
identified with Eisenstein's position. To state that "something is wrong"
(an assertion of an objective lie) is to assert a truth. It is a truth about
what is a lie. An example may help. A non-feminist might say, "Women
are not subordinated." I suspect that Linda Gordon and Zillah Eisenstein
would say that this statement is wrong-it is an objective lie. Why is this
statement wrong? Because we believe that women are subordinated-an
objective truth. Our ability to dispute an objective lie also enables us to
assert an objective truth, yet Eisenstein denies our ability to come to com-
mon understandings concerning objective truths because our perspectives
are necessarily subjective.
I would argue that Gordon's statement is wrong because there are both
objective lies and objective truths. In fact, the existence of both phenom-
ena is essential to feminist theory. Thus, my response to Eisenstein's (re-
formulated) claim and my response to her use of Gordon's statements are
17. But see S. FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 29 (1989) (arguing that relativistic the-
ory of truth is not contradictory; relativism does not claim "that there are no foundations, but that
whatever foundations there are . . . have been established by persuasion").
18. Alternatively, Eisenstein does not mean to make the claim that there are no objective truths.
Sophisticated critical analyses apparently do not make that claim. See Williams, Critical Legal Stud-
ies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429,
488-95 (1987) (discussing "law as indeterminate" critiques made at various levels of sophistication).
Instead, she may be trying to state that legal scholars and others may have overstated our ability to
discern objective truth. Much of what has been called objective truth is, on closer examination, not
objective truth. There is nothing in Eisenstein's text that would lead me to believe that this is her
basic claim. Nevertheless, I acknowledge that other critical scholars make this more sophisticated
claim, with which I have no disagreement.
19. P. 23 (quoting Gordon, What's New in Women's History?, in FEMINIST STUDIES, CRITICAL
STUDIES 22 (T. de Lauretis ed. 1986)).
20. Id.
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really the same. Both positions are untenable because they claim that
there are no objective truths, thereby overlooking the various ways in
which feminist theory needs to rely on objective truths.
In order to make my argument about objectivity clearer, I need to offer
a distinction between feminist arguments that are (1) a description of real-
ity or (2) a critique of that reality based on a set of ethics. As a legal-
political movement, feminist theory needs a way to explain how we can
hope to use the courts to improve women's condition in society. That
strategy requires us to believe that there is a language and a set of ethics
upon which we can rely to improve the conditions of this society. I would
suggest that feminism is successful when it is able to ground its claims on
universally-held ethics that are an "objective" part of our reality. If those
ethics do not exist, then feminism cannot hope to be successful.
I will now translate this observation into the distinction that I have
offered above. Reality, as it is presently constituted, cannot be objective
because it must be historically specific rather than transhistorical. We can
only describe reality from a particular perspective, such as from that of
the condition of a woman, making it difficult for a description of reality to
be universally shared. Thus, I agree with Eisenstein and other feminists
who say that descriptions of reality cannot be objective.
Nevertheless, we need to be careful not to overstate how much the fact
that descriptions of reality are not objective impedes our ability as femi-
nists to move forward politically. Our disagreements with non-feminists,
especially those who are women, are not always disagreements over de-
scriptions of reality. For example, Phyllis Schlafly and Catharine Mac-
Kinnon might describe reality as containing the same material conditions,
such as women's economic dependency on men within marriage.21 Al-
though I would expect that other non-feminists (especially male non-
feminists) would not be willing to concede that women are economically
dependent on men within marriage, that is not the point of disagreement
between Schlafly and MacKinnon. Schlafly and MacKinnon disagree
about feminism despite the fact that they may describe the world simi-
larly. Whether descriptions of reality are objective or subjective, therefore,
does not necessarily have implications for understanding our disagree-
ments with non-feminists.
The disagreement between Schlafly and MacKinnon emerges at the
second step in my distinction-at the step of critique. Schlafly would call
life conditions fulfilling or satisfying which MacKinnon would label sub-
ordinating.22 The disagreement between MacKinnon and Schlafly, as we
21. See C. MAcKINNON, supra note 6, at 21-31 (debate with Phyllis Schlafly).
22. As MacKinnon noted:
She [Schlafly] and I see a similar world, but we portray it differently. We see similar
facts but have very different explanations and evaluations of those facts.
We both see substantial differences between the situations of women and of men. She
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move from step one-description of reality-to step
two-critique-involves a difference in ethics.
The goal of feminist theory, I would suggest, is to convince people that
the agreed-upon description of reality is wrong-that it has the name of
subordination. It is at this point that I would argue that feminist theory
necessarily must turn to a set of objective ethics or aspirations in order to
be successful. Only by showing how this present reality stands in conflict
with our agreed-upon ethical standards (i.e., a sense of "justice") can we
convince society that that reality is wrong. If no such ethical standards
exist, then feminist arguments concerning perspective and power would
swing endlessly back and forth. In order to move forward in a lasting
way, it would seem necessary for feminist theory to be able to rely upon a
universal set of ethical standards.
Let me turn to another example to clarify this argument. The Federal-
ist Society at Tulane Law School recently invited me to debate John
Baker, a Professor at Louisiana State University, on the topic of abor-
tion.23 Baker's position was that Louisiana should reinstate its 1855 anti-
abortion statute, which made it a criminal offense with a penalty of up to
ten years at hard labor for individuals who assist a woman in procuring
an abortion. 4 The statute contained only one exception-when the wo-
man's life was at risk by continuing the pregnancy.
The initial question that I ask myself in preparing my talk is: What do
I think I could say that would possibly move some members of the audi-
ence to my position? I realize that my description of reality is probably
different than that of many members of the audience. I try to think about
abortion from the perspective of the most disadvantaged women in our
society-poor, young women who face an unwanted pregnancy and who
do not have the financial resources to afford good prenatal care or offer a
newborn an adequate home. I realize that these women, like all women,
face unacceptable contraceptive options since no form of contraception that
women can use is safe and effective. I also wonder about the life condi-
tions that cause these women to face an unwanted pregnancy, because it
does not seem plausible to me that any woman would engage in sexual
intercourse in order to face an unwanted pregnancy. I also realize that if
interprets jhe distinctions as natural or individual. I see them as fundamentally social.
She sees them as inevitable or just-or perhaps inevitable therefore just-either as good
and to be accepted or as individually overcomeable with enough will and application. I
see women's situation as unjust, contingent, and imposed.
Id. at 21.
23. The debate was labelled a "discussion" at my request and occurred on October 11, 1989.
24. LA. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 14:87 (West 1986) (declared unconstitutional in Weeks v. Connick,
No. 73-469 (E.D. La. Jan. 26, 1976) and its enforcement enjoined in Weeks, No. 73-469 (E.D. La.
Feb. 20, 1976)). A motion by Orleans Parish District Attorney Harry Connick to reinstate the statute
in light of Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989), was denied on January 20,
1990. See Motion Under Federal Rule 60 (B)(5) to Dissolve the Court's Injunction Against Enforce-
ment of L.A. R.S. 14:87, 87.4 and 88, Weeks, 73-469; The Wash. Post, July 11, 1989, at A14.
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these women choose to take an unwanted pregnancy to term and place the
child for adoption, they would have to live with the knowledge that the
child may face a lifetime of living in adoption agencies and foster homes,
especially if that child is a member of a racial minority group or handi-
capped. Although this is the world I see, it may not be the world of which
people in my audience are aware. Thus, my first step is to describe reality
from my perspective and hope that I can expand the knowledge of my
audience to encompass multiple perspectives.
Even if I can expand the perspective on reality of my audience, how-
ever, I realize that this expansion may not help me to succeed in the de-
bate. I still need a vehicle through which I can convince others that the
imposition of the Louisiana criminal statute would be wrong. At this
stage, I try to speak from what I perceive to be the universal ethics that
are present in that room. The ethic that I rely on is equal respect. I ask
the question whether a society or legislature that respects women's well-
being could respond to women's life conditions with a statement like that
of the Louisiana legislature. I argue that a society that is anti-abortion
because of the value it places on potential life should also respect the well-
being of adult women who find themselves facing an unwanted preg-
nancy. Such a society, I argue, would have to first attempt to change the
material conditions which cause women to face unwanted pregnancies.
Such material conditions include unsafe and unacceptable contraceptive
options as well as coercive, male sexual behavior. A respectful society, I
argue, would not place all of the burdens on women and none of the
burdens on men. A respectful society would try to make men at least as
responsible as women in making informed reproductive decisions. The
present regime gives women no societal support during or after their preg-
nancy through pre-natal care, child care, paid maternity leave, etc., and
then tries to impose on women the sanction of the criminal law when they
cannot meet the substantial responsibilities of pregnancy; this regime, I
argue, is extremely disrespectful to women. Through such an ethical
framework, I would hope to reach some of the anti-abortion advocates in
the room.
Was my argument successful? I did not poll the audience so I cannot
offer an empirical response. However, I can observe that many people
came up to me afterwards and said that they considered themselves to be
"pro-life" yet they were moved by what I had said and found that they
now had to re-think their positions on the Louisiana legislation. Interest-
ingly, some of those people were women of color who may have been able
to agree with my description of reality and then could see the strength of
my ethical argument. Thus, even I agree that the fact that there are uni-
versally-held ethics does not make our task as feminists easy. We still
must face enormous disputes with others over our perspectives on an ever-
changing reality. But, by recognizing that there are universally shared
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ethics present in the room, we can hope to find a voice with which to
speak to an audience.
If I am correct that there are some objective truths, the question be-
comes one of establishing those truths. Elsewhere, I have argued that fem-
inists need to develop a system of ethics that has applicability to law.25
The ethics that I have suggested-love, compassion, and wisdom-are
ones that I think are shared by most major religious traditions and by a
broad range of the political spectrum. These ethics can be the foundation
for law because of their universal applicability. Such ethics are, in a sense,
objective truths about our aspirations for society. If we truly share these
ethics, then we might be able to establish that women are subordinated
and that subordination is wrong.
When I have tried to present such a theory of knowledge and conscious-
ness, I have been accused by feminists of being an "essentialist"-one who
assumes that humans have innate characteristics-and of not understand-
ing that individuals are socially constructed.2 6 I think my critics are
wrong. The recognition that we are socially constructed leads to the fur-
ther recognition that we are constructed to share language and certain
values with others. It actually makes more sense to assume that there are
shared truths in a socially constructed world than in an essentialist
world. 7 Our task politically is to discover which of those shared truths
can be used as a basis for constructing yet a better world. We do not need
to look to nature or biology for the source of our feminist values. By ap-
plying those values that already exist more universally in society, we can
move society in a feminist direction.
If I am correct that we can gain control over our social construction in
order to move it in the direction that will further our own well-being, the
methodological question is how to sort out the good moves from the bad.
The fact that we are socially constructed means that we are constructed to
perpetuate our own oppression. It is therefore quite a challenge to break
out of that set of shared truths .and move towards truths that might benefit
our well-being. I would hope that radical feminists would begin to tell us
how they know the "truths" of which they speak so that we can begin to
evaluate what processes may lead to the discovery of such "truths."2
25. See Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion: Toward Love, Consciousness and Wisdom,
77 CALIF. L. REv. 1014 (1989).
26. Such comments were made to me when I presented my work at the University of Wisconsin
Feminist Legal Theory Institute as well as in personal correspondence from various feminists, such as
Alison Jaggar. In general, I do not think that Eisenstein and other feminist scholars have appropri-
ately examined the ways that contemporary liberal legal scholars make claims about objectivity. For
an excellent discussion of the ways that critical scholars often misunderstand liberal claims about
objectivity, see Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. REv. 332, 371 (1986) (arguing that
claim to "group objectivity," i.e., conformity to norms of justification, is "unexceptional empirical
claim true of many discourses").
27. I thank John Stick for helping me with this idea.
28. I have tried to share my own processes in discerning truth with readers by discussing the
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Our ability to discern a few truths in a cautious manner should be
compatible with Eisenstein's perspective. For example, in discussing the
importance of embracing both specificity and unity, she says that such an
approach allows us to "focus in between the poles . ,,. She is trying
to move beyond bipolar thinking and help us to find a way to embrace
both specificity and unity (or difference and sameness). My approach sim-
ply widens her embrace. I am suggesting that there is a second
scale-between relativism and objectivity. Rather than embrace relativism,
I am suggesting that we seek a minimalism which respects specificity and
unity while also seeking, in some cases, to embrace an objective truth that
is open to revision. Thus, we can say that law is wrong in the way that it
has tried to apply the concept of equal respect to women in general, while
also saying that at this time we have not reached a consensus on how this
concept should be applied to women when they are pregnant.
I suspect that Eisenstein's dismissal of our ability to speak "objectively"
stems from her critique of sexual objectification. Because she disfavors
women's so-called objectified treatment by men, like many feminists, she
discards the possibility of our ever speaking objectively in a way that does
not perpetuate women's subordination. 0 What I am suggesting is that
feminists do need to criticize objectification in many of the forms in which
it is perpetuated, such as in the form of sexual objectification. However,
our critique of objectification, like our critique of purported sameness and
differences, should not lead us to dismiss the possibility of developing and
building upon a universal ethical standard. In each case, we must be cau-
tious and ensure that we have considered the complexity of women's and
men's lives in making a particular claim. We may later have to revise our
claim in the face of further knowledge. However, feminism needlessly
abandons the possibility of developing a set of ethics for assessing the
human condition when it discards entirely the possibility of speaking ob-
jectively. Rather than assert as true that we cannot speak objectively of
any truths, I hope that Eisenstein and other feminists will begin to ex-
plore how it is that we know the few truths that we do know as feminists,
so that we can begin to expand on this structure of knowledge.
benefits of meditation and contemplation. See Colker, supra note 25.
29. P. 36.
30. Other feminists who more explicitly make the connection between their critique of sexual
objectification and objectivity include Catharine MacKinnon and Martha Minow. See, e.g., MacKin-
non, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Towards Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635
(1983); Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L.
REv. 10 (1987).
1168 [Vol. 99: 1159
Truths and Lies
II. MULTIPLE MEANINGS APPLIED TO THE PREGNANT BODY AND
EQUALITY
In recognizing the multiple meanings of social facts, Eisenstein's ap-
proach insists that we are affected by law while we also have the strength
to resist it. For example, special treatment legislation with respect to preg-
nancy may reinforce stereotypes about women's "inherent weakness" and,
at the same time, help women to live under more humane conditions. In
addition, she would argue that the meanings of pregnancy are not created
entirely by law; women can work to change the meaning and significance
of being pregnant irrespective of the legal status of pregnancy.-1 She sug-
gests that each side of the special treatment/equal treatment debate has
made the mistake of not recognizing multiple meanings that can co-exist;
each thinks that the only meaning the pregnant body can have is the one
created by law. Eisenstein criticizes the view of the ACLU in adopting the
equal treatment perspective, which insists that women who are pregnant
be treated like other workers who are facing disabilities. The ACLU justi-
fies its position by noting the harm that protective labor legislation has
historically imposed on women's position in society. Eisenstein says that
the ACLU is wrong to use history to reach that conclusion: Special legis-
lation, she argues, does not "cause" women to be regarded as different.
Women are regarded as different irrespective of whether legislation recog-
nizes that fact.3 2 Eisenstein says, for example, "It is true that with [special
protection] legislation in place, some employers will think twice about hir-
ing a woman, but many of them will think twice about doing so any-
how." 3 Eisenstein also criticizes the ACLU position for assuming that
meaning stays the same over time. Late twentieth century discourse about
women differs markedly from that of the late nineteenth century. Thus,
we need to understand legislation within contemporary discourse in order
to evaluate its impact on women. 4
I think that Eisenstein is correct to suggest that we can recognize multi-
ple meanings and therefore not find it necessary to choose transhistorical
theoretical positions. Nevertheless, she overstates her position when she
asserts that we can often work successfully within a combined theoretical
approach (i.e., difference plus sameness) at a particular time in history.
Although combined theoretical approaches may be possible on some is-
sues, they are not successful on all issues; our task as feminists should be
to make the difficult historical judgment about which theoretical approach
will work best at a particular time.
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A. A Case Study: Abortion
The costs of not sufficiently struggling with and making important the-
oretical choices about important issues can be seen by examining the abor-
tion issue. Our inability or unwillingness to engage in such a searching
inquiry, and, instead, to accept an obvious "compromise" position may be
extremely dangerous to women's well-being. The fact that theoretical in-
quiries are not possible on a transhistorical basis does not make them im-
possible or imprudent within a particular historical context.
Eisenstein acknowledges that radical feminists took a liberal path in the
courtroom to achieve victories in the abortion context. She suggests that
there is no harm in feminists choosing liberal arguments in the courtroom
and radical arguments in the political arena. 5 I would argue, by contrast,
that feminists made the wrong choice in picking liberal pro-choice privacy
arguments rather than radical pro-women, equality arguments in litigat-
ing the abortion issue. That theoretical decision has had enormous ramifi-
cations and should have been considered more fully at the time it was
made.
As Eisenstein acknowledges, the argument presented to the Court, and
accepted by it in Roe v. Wade, 6 was a classic liberal argument for pri-
vacy. Women argued for and won the right to "choose" to have an abor-
tion without state interference. However, the state was not required to
take any steps to facilitate the broadening of the private sphere, thereby
making that choice more available to all women in society. Thus, in Har-
ris v. McRae,3 7 the Supreme Court ruled that states need not fund abor-
tions under Medicaid. In the Supreme Court's most recent abortion deci-
sion, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,"8 the Court demonstrated
further that states may do quite a bit to restrict abortion so long as they
do not burden that choice with the force of the criminal laws.
39
35. Eisenstein recognizes that pro-choice abortion arguments have been liberal arguments, and she
further recognizes that privacy arguments do not protect women's well-being without society's com-
mitment to equality. Nevertheless, she refrains from criticizing the privacy strategy, suggesting that
we can afford to use that strategy in the courts without undercutting equality arguments elsewhere.
P. 188. I would suggest that the seeming success of the privacy arguments in the courts numbed
feminists and prevented them from realizing how superficial those rights were. It is interesting that
now that abortion seems not to be even minimally protected under privacy doctrine, feminists are
showing renewed interest in the politics of abortion and equality-based argument. For example, the
November 12, 1989, pro-choice march in Washington, D.C., was labelled "Mobilizing for Womens
Lives."
36. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
37. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
38. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
39. The Supreme Court's decision this year to grant certiorari on abortion cases that do not in-
volve criminal measures suggests that it will soon permit further restrictions on abortion. See Hodgson
v. Minnesota, 853 F.2d 1452 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 58 U.S.L.W. 3046 (U.S. Aug. 1, 1989)
(Nos. 88-1125 & 88-1309) (parental notification); Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Slaby,
854 F.2d 852 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. granted sub nom. Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
58 U.S.L.W. 3045-46 (U.S. Aug. 1, 1989) (No. 88-805) (parental notification) 3045-46; Turnock v.
Ragsdale, 841 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir. 1988) cert. granted sub nom. 58 U.S.L.W. 3045 (U.S. Aug. 1,
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That result, although also criticized by many liberals, can be seen as a
consequence of the use of liberal, privacy arguments in the abortion area.
We gave the courts the opportunity to broaden the private sphere, thereby
leaving abortion decisions a part of women's "privacy," yet permitting the
state to encumber women's choices in many ways.40 Although this result
was not an inevitable result of the choice of the liberal, pro-choice, pri-
vacy perspective, it is certainly a result that could be attained easily under
that framework. Thus, a judge as clever as Chief Justice Rehnquist did
not need to overturn Roe in order to permit the state of Missouri to en-
cumber abortions in Webster and Harris.
Some people might argue that we have retrenched on the abortion issue,
not because of the type of argument used, but because of the change in
political climate. I would certainly agree that political changes in the com-
position of the Court had an impact on the retrenchment that has taken
place. However, I do not think we can afford to overlook the fact that our
choice of doctrine has also played a role.
Justice Marshall has stood alone in recognizing that an equal protec-
tion approach is necessary for the Court to deal adequately with the abor-
tion issue." Justice Blackmun, the author of the Roe opinion, has never
endorsed Marshall's equal protection approach. Until Webster, Blackmun
argued that a privacy approach could invalidate the restrictions that legis-
latures imposed on abortions. In Webster, however, Justice Blackmun
seemed to recognize that the privacy approach could not invalidate all
measures which needlessly raise the cost of abortion and thereby make it
disproportionately unavailable for poor women. One of the issues in Web-
ster was the constitutionality of pre-viability testing requirements.4
Blackmun found those requirements to be unconstitutional on a technolog-
ical ground, because many of the required tests were not possible at the
stage of gestation at which they were required. Nevertheless, Blackmun
acknowledged that he would "see little or no conflict with Roe"' if the
statute could not be interpreted to require inappropriate viability tests.
Thus, Blackmun was unable to protect women's well-being fully under
his privacy framework; he needed to rely on a technical argument to con-
clude that the statute was unconstitutional.
I would like to suggest that the results in Harris and Webster would
have been difficult to attain if the original Roe decision had been couched
1989) (No. 88-790) (regulation of clinics) (case settled).
40. For further discussion, see Fudge, The PubliclPrivate Distinction: The Possibilities of and
the Limits to the Use of Charter Litigation to Further Feminist Struggles, 25 OSGOODE HA.L L.J.
485 (1987).
41. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 341-46 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
42. The statute specified that a physician, prior to performing an abortion on any woman who he
or she has reason to believe is 20 or more weeks pregnant, must ascertain whether the fetus is "via-
ble" by performing "such medical examinations and tests as are necessary to make a finding of the
[fetus'] gestational age, weight, and lung maturity." Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.029 (Supp. 1989).
43. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3070 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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in pro-women, equality terms, because the underlying justificatory scheme
would have been stronger. Rather than discussing abortion as a right of
privacy, it-should have been discussed as an issue about the respect which
society accords women. Such a framework would require us to consider
abortion as a question about what responsibilities society is entitled to
impose on each of us: Would a legislature that truly respected women's
well-being, as seen from the perspective of women themselves, have been
willing to impose these regulations on abortion?44 That approach would
be communitarian-asking about our appropriate responsibilities as mem-
bers of a community-rather than individualistic. Thus, I would argue
under such a perspective that society cannot encumber women's decisions
to have an abortion at this time, because society does not treat women's
reproductive capacity with respect. So long as society fails to provide safe
and effective contraception, health insurance to pregnant women, pre- and
post-natal care for women and their children, low-cost child care, and
rape laws that truly ensure that sexual relations are consensual and mu-
tual, it is not entitled to impose upon women the burden of bringing a
fetus to term. Abortion regulations, under such a framework, are prob-
lematic not because we want women to be protected in their privacy but
because we want society to create an environment in which women are
treated with community-based respect.45
Under this latter approach, I would argue that Harris v. McRae could
not have come out the way it did. The plaintiffs in Harris understood this
fact and made a strong equality argument, which the Court rejected."6
Similarly, in Webster, women of color and juvenile women filed briefs in
which they argued that the cost of abortions had a disparate impact on
poor, young women and that they were the group most likely to delay
having abortions." Therefore, these women would disproportionately in-
cur the added expense of unnecessary viability tests. Because a major rea-
son that poor, young women delayed having abortions was their inability
to obtain the necessary funds, this cost-raising measure could be expected
to have a substantial impact on their already strained ability to procure an
abortion. Thus, instead of talking about privacy doctrine, these women
44. Elsewhere, I have called this approach "equality as compassion." See Colker, supra note 25.
An important aspect of this approach is that we act in a respectful manner toward
others-considering their well-being from their perspective. Simone Weil's work has considerably in-
fluenced this approach. Weil spent her life trying to treat others from such a perspective. See Teuber,
Simone Weil: Equality as Compassion, 43 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL Rs. 221, 235-36 (1982).
45. I discuss this approach more fully in Colker, supra note 25.
46. The plaintiffs in Harris v. McRae made a class-based equality argument concerning the im-
pact of the statute on the lives of pcor women. The same argument could be made in sex-based terms,
focusing on the impact on women, particularly poor women.
47. See Brief Amid Curiae of the National Council of Negro Women, Inc. et al. in Support of
Appellees at 695-98, Webster (No. 88-605); Brief of Amici Curiae American Public Health Associa-
tion, et al. in Support of Appellees at 22-23, Webster (No. 88-605).
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talked about how the regulations at issue in Webster jeopardized their
lives and health.48
Some people might respond that the problem with my suggested ap-
proach is that it does not provide women with an absolute right to choose
an abortion under any historical circumstances. If society treated women
and their reproductive capacity with respect, then the state might be able
to justify certain restrictions on abortion (not including the use of the
criminal law which would be inherently disrespectful). I do not find that
result troubling because the restrictions would have to be respectful of
women's well-being. If the restrictions were not respectful, they would be
unconstitutional.
For example, I could imagine that in a society that respects women's
well-being, the legislature might decide to require women who seek abor-
tions to undergo pre- and post-abortion counselling in order to respond to
the possibility of post-abortion emotional trauma. Under the privacy ap-
proach, feminists might oppose such regulations because they threaten the
privacy of women's abortion decisions. Under an equality approach, such
regulations could be constitutional if they served women's well-being. The
equality approach would recognize that states can sometimes interfere in
women's lives to protect their well-being.
We are fooling ourselves if we think that using the privacy approach
makes abortion absolutely available to women. It does not. It makes abor-
tion available to privileged women, who can afford the high price that
society insists they pay for it. Other women will experience unwanted
childbirths or illegal abortions, which are cheaper but endanger their
health. I find the equality approach much more satisfying. The "right"
that it creates is created for all women, not simply for privileged women
who can afford the purchase price of privacy.
The abortion issue is therefore an example where the choice of perspec-
tives-liberal privacy theory rather than radical group-based theory-is a
distinction with a difference. Eisenstein is wrong to suggest that we can
choose one strategy in the court room-liberalism-and another strategy
in the streets-equality. Our perspective in the courtroom affects our
strategies in the streets.
Thus, feminists need to be more diligent in ensuring that we are mak-
ing effective legal arguments on particular issues that will really serve
women's well-being. I have no problem with pragmatism. I can imagine
48. See, e.g., Brief Amid Curiae of the National Council of Negro Women, Inc. et at. in Support
of Appellees, Webster (No. 88-605). Essentially, they argued that making abortion illegal or restrict-
ing abortion simply raises the cost of having an abortion. For poor women, abortion restrictions cause
them to: (1) delay having an abortion until they have the necessary financial resources, often causing
them to have a second trimester rather than a first trimester abortion; (2) forego having an abortion
and undergo the enormous costs of unwanted childbirth; or (3) have an illegal abortion that is cheaper
but poses substantial health risks. None of these options protects the lives of women who face un-
wanted pregnancies and are often poor and young.
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us concluding after a searching inquiry that the more "liberal" sameness
approach is appropriate in the pregnancy context and that the more "rad-
ical" equality approach is appropriate in the abortion context. No matter
which choice we make, however, we must think through its full practical
consequences.
B. Some Helpful Insights
Despite these criticisms, I found Eisenstein's work very helpful in con-
tributing to my understanding of how to describe in legal terms why preg-
nancy-based legislation constitutes sex discrimination. Eisenstein empha-
sizes the importance of thinking of the body as a capacity, not a static
entity, and a capacity that has multiple meanings. In the pregnancy con-
text, the Supreme Court has concluded that pregnancy-based legislation is
not sex-based legislation because both women and men can be non-
pregnant persons."9 Eisenstein criticizes this result, using a familiar femi-
nist line that the Court's error is its use of the male norm in defining
what constitutes sex-based inequality."0
Although Eisenstein's criticism is appropriate, I think that her perspec-
tive suggests an even stronger criticism. The category of non-pregnant
persons does include both women and men; however, the Court's error
was in not recognizing that women and men are not similarly situated in
their non-pregnant status. Nearly all women are affected by pregnancy-
based discrimination irrespective of whether they are pregnant, because
nearly all women have the capacity to become pregnant. For example, if a
state does not provide mandatory pregnancy leave, then a woman may
choose to defer or avoid childbirth because childbirth is not feasible for
her without the guarantee of pregnancy leave. A man, however, cannot
become pregnant and is not affected by the presence or absence of mater-
nity leave in the same way. Pregnancy disability leave is never available to
him since he does not face disabilities when his wife or lover becomes
pregnant. Admittedly, the inconvenience to his female partner of becoming
pregnant may influence his decision whether to agree to a childbearing
decision; however, I would suggest that childbearing decisions are not as
significant in most men's lives as in most women's lives. Thus, the mean-
ing of being non-pregnant is not the same for women and men due to the
interaction between biology and culture. For women, the California disa-
bility policy at issue in Geduldig5' impacts them in a sex-specific way
irrespective of whether they are or are not pregnant. The Court's error
under Eisenstein's theory, then, is failing to examine the comparability
49. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 n.20 (1974).
50. Pp. 66-67.
51. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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between women and men who are not pregnant. It did not explore the
multiple meanings of the non-pregnant person.
In sum, Eisenstein's work does not make it easier for me to contemplate
how to combat sex-based inequalities relating to women's reproductive
status. I still may face difficult pragmatic choices between the special
treatment and equal treatment approaches. However, her work does pro-
vide me with fresh insight into how I need to examine closely both sides of
the equality equation-both the side that is supposed to represent differ-
ence as well as the side that is supposed to represent sameness-to see
whether a purported sameness is one when we use a theory of meaning
that recognizes multiple and changing truths.
III. TOWARDS A FEMINIST THEORY OF JURISPRUDENCE
Legal argumentation requires us to claim that we are right and our
opponent is wrong. Moreover, it has been commonplace for feminists to
ask the courts to dictate to the legislature the parameters of what they can
do constitutionally. This is often called judicial activism. But how do femi-
nists attain confidence necessary to make such claims, given the feminist
critique of consciousness? In order to say that we are right and our oppo-
nent is wrong and that, moreover, the courts should dictate right answers
to the legislature, it would seem that feminist theory would have to be
quite confident of its ability to know the truth.
I would like to suggest, based on Eisenstein's work, that feminists need
to learn to make legal arguments in a way that is more sensitive to femi-
nist understandings of truth. Specifically, feminists need to show that they
are open to multiple meanings and are open to the possibility that they
may be wrong when they make legal arguments. On the other hand, femi-
nists should also learn from their practice that they do believe in some
truths. Both openness and an articulation of truth are necessary.
Let me again return to the abortion issue as an example. I have sug-
gested above that the appropriate way, from a radical feminist perspective,
to think about the abortion issue is in a communitarian, group-based way.
I have said that we should think about whether society has sufficiently
demonstrated its respect for women's well-being in the manner in which it
restricts abortion. And I have said that I have no problem concluding that
society, as presently constituted, does not sufficiently respect women's
well-being when it tries to restrict abortion.
Nevertheless, I must recognize that abortion presents multiple mean-
ings, some of which are troubling. Quite simply, as a radical feminist, I
believe it is important to value life. Thus, I, like many radical feminists,
oppose capital punishment and am both a pacifist and a vegetarian. Given
that concern for life, the abortion issue is a very difficult one. Although it
is necessary to protect women's lives and well-being by permitting abor-
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tion, it is also unfortunate that society's disrespect for women must cause
the termination of fetal life. The way I think through the abortion issue
reflects an openness to the many meanings and values that are present in
the abortion controversy. I oppose state regulation of abortion, yet try to
maintain an openness on that issue in the event that I have not appropri-
ately considered how the prevalence of abortion may harm the fabric of
society.
If feminists were true to Eisenstein's call for openness, I think that fem-
inists would have to talk about abortion in more tentative language, simi-
lar to what I have used above. But if you read the briefs filed in abortion
cases or the many articles written on the subject by pro-choice feminists,
you will not find that openness.52 You rarely, if ever, find a feminist who
will even acknowledge that pro-life advocates are right to encourage us to
make sure we value life dearly.53 And when I have tried to acknowledge
my own openness to the values expressed by pro-life advocates, I have
sometimes been told that I am not a "real feminist."
In sum, I wonder if the nature of legal argumentation-which requires
us to argue about difficult issues in black and white terms-has caused us,
as feminists, to lose the openness to competing views that Eisenstein says
is essential to feminist theory. Even if feminists find that they cannot
change the way they talk to courts, I hope that we begin to re-examine
how we talk to each other. I hope that feminist theory moves in the direc-
tion of openness rather than dogmatism.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this essay, I have suggested that we can try to speak the truth to
courts but that we need to do so in a radical voice that also recognizes the
multiple and open meanings contained in truth. Zillah Eisenstein has as-
sisted me in trying to address this concern; I encourage others to read her
book and engage in open dialogue.
52. Eisenstein's work does not reflect openness when she discusses abortion, because she never
recognizes the plausibility of wanting to protect the valuation of life. She discusses abortion as if
women's well-being is all that is at stake. Pp. 184-85.
53. An exception would be writings by Buddhist feminists in which they favor women's right to
choose an abortion but acknowledge that women should undergo a grieving process when they do
choose an abortion. See, e.g., Klein, Buddhist Views on Abortion, 6 SPRING WIND-BUDDHIST CUL-
TURAL F. 166, 170-71 (1986) (special issue on women and Buddhism).
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